As state and local governments have devoted a rising share of their resources to crime-related programmes, concerns have arisen that spending on other programmes such as education will fall. Coupled with growing public concerns over performance of the public education system, and expectations that prison populations will rise as states pass and enforce more stringent sentencing laws, it is not surprising that some view the expansion of crime-related programmes as troublesome. One hypothesis is that education and crime-related programmes directly compete for government ex penditures so that what one programme gains the other must lose as in a ® xed-pie situation. A competing hypothesis is that spending on these two public programmes are unrelated and therefore higher crime-related spending may also lead to higher taxes or public debt issuance, or to reduction in spending on programmes other than education. We estimate a three equation model of spending on crime-related pro grammes, spending on education, and the crime rate from which we directly test whether spending on crime and education in¯uence each other.
Given the desire to expand education spending, it is not surprising that its proponents view the expansion of crime related government spending as troublesome, either because they believe that it siphons o� dollars that could be used for education, or because of the view that fewer dollars spent on education today lead to greater expenditures on crime related programmes tomorrow as less-educated students are more likely to become criminals in the future. For example, passage in California of `three strikes and you are out' legislation has led some educators and parents to fear that, as it leads to higher crime-related expenditures ± especially those related to incarceration of criminals ± a continual and rapid diminution of expenditures on education will follow. A recent study by the Rand Corporation (Greenwood et al., 1994) predicts that California' s `three strikes' law carries a price tag of US $5.5 billion more in public spending on crime-related programmes. With more states taking a less lax attitude towards parole, and with more states consider ing legislation similar to California' s `three strikes' law, it appears that many states will witness growing commitments towards funding of crime-related programmes.
This paper examines the relationship between public spending on education and public spending on crime related programmes. As just discussed, it is often alleged, at least at the state and local government level, that education and crime-related programmes directly compete for govern ment expenditures so that what one programme gains the other must lose as in a ® xed-pie situation. Higher expendi tures on crime-related programmes are therefore asserted to reduce, or crowd-out, expenditures on education. Of course, this is one hypothesis and a competing hypothesis is that spending on these two public programmes is unrelated and therefore higher crime-related spending may also lead to higher taxes to public debt issuance, or to reduction in spending on non-crime-related programmes. This paper examines whether state and local expenditures on crime related programmes crowd-out state and local expenditures on education. We estimate a three equation model of spend ing on crime-related programmes, spending on education, and the crime rate from which we directly test whether spending on crime and education in¯uence each other.
II . PREVIOUS STUDIES
There has been little research conducted in the area of crowding-out among programmes of state and local govern ments. A review of this literature indicates that little or no evidence has been found to suggest any support for the hypothesis that higher crime-related funding, or funding of any programme for that matter, crowds-out funding on education. Brazer and McCarty (1987) test the `municipal overbur den' hypothesis that high demand for municipal services lowers the demand for public elementary and secondary education. This hypothesis suggests that those areas, pri marily urban, that require relatively higher expenditures directed towards dealing with poverty, aged housing, and crime will have fewer resources available for education funding. The authors concluded that empirical evidence o� ers no support for the `municipal overburden' hypothesis in the cases of per pupil funding among school districts in Connecticut, New Jersey, and Virginia during 1981± 82. However, they do ® nd several cases where a positive cor relation exists between municipal and education spending, which is in the opposite direction to that predicted by the `municipal overburden' hypothesis. Fossett and Wycko� (1996) examine the impact of rising Medicaid spending on public elementary and secondary education spending. Using a two-stage, least squares ® xed e� ects model, they test the hypothesis on data from 47 states from 1980 to 1990. While an inverse relationship is esti mated, it is not statistically signi® cant and therefore the authors conclude that there is no support for the hypothesis.
McCarty and Schmidt (1997) examine interactions among six spending programmes of state governments for evidence of crowding-out over eleven years, 1984± 94. The six programmes are elementary and secondary education, higher education, welfare, health and hospitals, corrections, and miscellaneous. They use a vector autoregression (VAR) model to examine whether changes in one programme are correlated with changes in other programmes, either over time or contemporaneously. No evidence of crowding-out is found. In most cases, when the programme's funding rises above-trend, it has no signi® cant in¯uence on future spend ing on other programmes. However, they found evidence that deviations from trend have signi® cant in¯uences on future own-programme spending which they interpret to indicate that higher above-trend spending in one pro gramme is funded through higher tax revenues than through spending reduction in other programmes.
There is a literature that examines how incarceration a� ects the crime rate and ultimately expenditures on prisons. Clark and Lee (1996) hypothesize that increases in lengths of prison terms cause the demand for prison space to grow at a diminishing rate as criminals react to longer expected sentence lengths by committing fewer crimes. In other words, the deterrence e� ects of longer sentences are assumed to more than outweigh longer prison terms thus leading to an overall reduction in demand for prison space. An implication of the Clark and Lee (1996) hypothesis is that voters and policymakers who push for shorter prison sentences and resist expanding current prison space as means of lowering costs are actually causing greater incen tives for criminal activity that ultimately lead to higher future costs as these policies lead to greater numbers of prisoners in the future. Cloninger (1996) argues that the Clark and Lee (1996) hypothesis rests on several assump tions that may be questionable, at least in the short-run, and suggests that e� ects of prison sentencing policies on demands for prison space are somewhat ambiguous. Clearly, this issue is extremely important when we consider that spending on prisons today have budgetary implications about spending on prisons tomorrow when such spending exerts signi® cant deterrence e� ects on criminal activity. We address this issue in our model by examining whether past changes in crime-related spending exert e� ects on crime rates over time.
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Another related issue is developed in Brumm and Cloninger (1995) which examines whether there is a direct correlation between the `war on drugs' and the homicide rate based on the hypothesis that the war on illicit drugs has diverted resources away from other law enforcement activ ities. If this is correct, Brumm and Cloninger (1995) predict that crime rates on non-drug-related activities are higher than they would otherwise be as the deterrence e� ect from law enforcement su� ers under reduced funding. Empirical evidence is reported that is consistent with the hypothesis that homicide rates are higher in communities that allocate relatively high percentages of law enforcement expenditures in the area of drug enforcement. This issue is important for our paper because it suggests that crowding-out of govern ment programmes may arise both between di� erent pro gramme categories (e.g., crime-related vs education vs mili tary) and within speci® c programmes (e.g., corrections vs law enforcement vs anti-crime advertising). In the area of crime, there are many di� erent subprogrammes and it is possible that one subprogramme such as corrections might crowd-out another subprogramme such as law enforcement. As just discussed, such an allocation may have implications for future spending when, for instance, fewer dollars allo cated to law enforcement today leads to greater incentives for criminal activity that ultimately lead to more prisoners, and therefore prison space, in the future. We address this issue by separately examining total crime-related spending and corrections spending and therefore test whether these two types of crime-related spending exert di� erential e� ects on both crime rates and on education spending.
II I. EDUCATION AND CRI ME-RELATED SPENDING EQUATI ONS
Education and crime-related expenditures are determined through the political process between voters and policy makers, within the budget (spending, tax, and debt) institu tions of state and local governments. Within the budget processes of governments, education and crime-related ex penditures are determined, along with expenditures in other budget categories. The total budget is then the sum of its component parts, where various demographic (e.g., age dis tribution), economic (e.g. unemployment rates), and cultural (e.g., past crime rates) characteristics then in¯uence demand for individual spending programmes.
The following models of cross-state education and crime related spending are estimated:
See Table 1 for a description of the variables, and 
Dependent variables
The dependent variables are educational expenditures EDEXP i , crime expenditures CRIME i , and the crime rate CR i . 7 The model is estimated twice, one for each of two years 1992 and 1985. These two years are chosen because they represent the longest time period for which consistent data on crime-related programmes is available.
Educational spending equation
Crime-related spending is included in the education spending equation to test the hypothesis that the two are intertwined in the public budget. A negative relation would Index of racial/ethnic diversity; the higher the value, the less diverse the population CR i
Crime o� ences known to police per 100 000 population; includes both violent and property crime CCR i
Change in crime rate (three-year change)
MEDAGE i
Median age of population
MID1 i
Percentage of population aged 18± 24
MID2 i
Percentage of population aged 25± 44
Percentage of justice-related employees in population, includes police protection, judicial, legal services and prosecution, public defence, corrections, and other justice employees.
UE i
Civilian unemployment rate
Change in civilian unemployment rate, (three year change)
suggest that higher crime-related spending crowds-out edu cation spending. A positive relation would suggest that higher spending on crime-related programmes leads to higher spending on education, or that states that allocate relatively many resources to crime-related programmes also allocate relatively many resources to education pro grammes. No relationship would suggest no linkage be tween the two spending programmes in the public budget.
The median voter theorem predicts that median voters dominate spending decisions. Median family income Y i is therefore hypothesized to be positively related to education spending. Higher educated voter are hypothesized to vote for more education and therefore a positive coe� cient is hypothesized for EDUC i , percentage of population with high school degrees. Population density DENSIT Y i measures the percentage of the population living in metro politan areas and, because production costs are commonly believed to be higher in metropolitan areas, it is hy pothesized to be positively related to education spending. The student percentage of the population ST UDENT i con trols for cross-state di� erences in student populations and is hypothesized to exert positive in¯uences on education spending because higher values may re¯ ect greater parental demands for education.
The state share of education funding ST AT E i , controls for the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) hypothesis that more centralized funding leads to the perception by taxpayers that local funding burdens are lower than under less central ized funding.
8 That is, the lower the cost of education perceived by taxpayers, the greater the demand for public education. A positive e� ect from the state share of funding is therefore hypothesized. 9 The federal share of education funding FED i is hypothesized to exert similar in¯uences on public education spending; i.e., a higher value of FED i leads to higher education spending if the cost perceived by state and local taxpayers falls.
The relationship between numbers of schools and educa tional expenditures is theoretically indeterminate. Substan tial economies of scale could be unexploited when there are relatively many schools so that a greater number of schools is associated with higher expenditures. But, a large number of schools could also be an indication of vigorous competi tion among governments, or school districts, with educa tional services delivered at low cost.
1 0 The Leviathan model of Brennan and Buchanan (1980) would predict that fewer schools lead to higher education spending because this re¯ ects less intergovernmental competition in the public education market. The hypothesized sign on SCHOOL S i , numbers of schools per 1000 students, is therefore an em pirical question.
The ethnic diversity of a state's population DIV i is ex pected to be positively related to educational expenditures. An ethnically diverse population often requires special education programmes that increase expenditures per pupil. An index of diversity was created for each state using race/ethnic groups reported by the Census Bureau: WhiteHispanic, Black-Hispanic, American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut-Hispanic, Asian Paci® c Islander-Hispanic, White non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, Aleut non-Hispanic and Asian Paci® c Islander non-Hispanic. The diversity index was calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of the population of each group. The greater is the diversity index, the less racially/ethnically diverse is a state's population. A negative e� ect, or a more diverse population leads to greater expenditures, is therefore hypothesized.
Crime spending equation
Equation spending is included in the crime spending equa tion to test the hypothesis that the two are interrelated in the public budget. A negative relation would suggest that higher education spending crowds-out crime spending. A positive relation would suggest that higher spending on education leads to higher spending on crime, or that `big' spenders on crime are also `big' spenders on education. No relationship would suggest no linkage between the two programmes.
The crime rate CR i , and its change over the previous three years CCR i , are hypothesized to exert positive in¯uen ces on crime spending. Higher crime rates, and higher recent increases in crime rates, are expected to raise crime-related spending as more resources are devoted to enforcement, court costs, incarceration, and prevention areas of public spending. As crime rates rise, the public may also demand higher expenditures, and given criminal codes and sentenc ing policies, greater crime activity results in higher public crime-related expenditures.
The dominance of crime-related employees in the popula tion DOM i controls for two possible e� ects on spending. First, the simple fact that there are relatively more em ployees should lead to higher payrolls, and therefore spend ing as well. Second, crime-related employees are a special interest group with an interest in promoting spending on crime programmes, and therefore they will exert a stronger force on the political process that determines public budget ing. Because, in both cases, a positive in¯uence from DOM i is hypothesized, higher shares of crime-related employees is hypothesized to lead to higher spending on crime pro grammes. While the average per cent of crime-related employees in the population is 0.56, it has a fairly large range running from a high of 0.85 (New York) to a low of 0.34 (West Virginia) in 1992. 
Crime rate equation
Following the logic that crime-related spending deters criminal activity, the contemporaneous level of crime related spending is hypothesized to exert a negative in¯uence on the crime rate. The ethnic diversity of a state's popula tion DIV i is hypothesized to in¯uence crime rates, based on the expectation that an ethnically diverse population creates greater cultural con¯icts and tensions that result in higher crime rates. The previous year's crime rate, CR i ± 1 , is expected to exert a positive in¯uence on the crime rate. Median income is hypothesized to exert a negative in¯uence on the crime rate based on the economic argument that individuals ® nd criminal activity more attractive as their (legal) opportunities to earn income fall.
We hypothesize that the more youthful the population, the higher are crime rates because a disproportionate share of crimes is committed by juveniles and young adults. The following population variables are included: MID1 i is per centage of population aged 18± 24, and MID2 i is percentage of population aged 25± 44. Higher values of both variables are expected to raise crime rates because a majority of crimes are committed within these age brackets. Median age, MEDAGE i , is used to control for di� erences in median ages across the states.
The civilian unemployment rate UE i is hypothesized to be positively related to crime rates because, in those states with relatively fewer jobs, there may be a greater incentive for criminal activity. The three-year change in the unem ployment rate CUE i is hypothesized to exert a positive in¯uence on crime rates because, the higher a recent increase in unemployment, the greater the incentive for criminal activity. Use of CUE i also controls for the fact that some states have persistently high or low unemployment rates, as in¯uenced by geographic or industrial characteristics, and therefore the very fact that a state has a relatively high unemployment rate does not necessarily always suggest the same event when some states have persistently high unem ployment rates and others have high unemployment rates that are more transitory in nature.
We included the probability of arrest in our crime rate equations based on the hypothesis that higher values of this variable lead to lower crime rates as expected punishment from committing crimes is perceived to be higher by poten tial criminals. For each state, Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports provides number of crimes and the crime rate per 100 000 inhabitants and from these numbers we constructed the probability of arrest. Estimations found that this variable was never statistically signi® cant and therefore we do not show these runs here as its inclusion into our model never changed the signi® cance or sign of the other independent variables. Perhaps lack of signi® cance is a result of having already captured this variable in our lagged crime rate variable.
IV. ESTIMATI ON OF CRI ME AND EDUCATI ON SPENDI NG EQUATIONS
The two stage least squares (TSLS) technique is used to estimate the model because the education and crime-related spending equations each contain dependent variables as right-hand-side variables. Estimation using ordinary least squares (OLS) is inappropriate for a system of equations that contain interrelationships between sets of variables. Table 3 displays TSLS estimates of our three equation model using 1992 and 1985 data. Let us discuss the ® rst three columns which display the estimates of education spending, crime spending, and the crime rate in 1992. In both cases of public spending equations, spending on one programme exerts a signi® cant positive in¯uence on spend ing on the other programme. That is, spending on crime is found to positively in¯uence education spending, and spending on education is found to positively in¯uence spending on crime. Contrary to claims of those who believe that spending on crime-related programmes crowds-out education spending, the in¯uences are positive, not negative. In the education spending equation, signi® cant in¯uences are crime-related spending (positive), income (positive, as hypothesized), education (negative, contrary to expecta tions), federal share of spending (negative), and numbers of schools (positive). In the case of the crime spending equa tion, signi® cant in¯uences are education spending (positive), the contemporaneous crime rate (positive, as hypothesized), and employee dominance (positive, as hypothesized). Es timation of the crime rate equation indicates the following signi® cant in¯uences: previous year's crime rates (positive, as hypothesized) and the percentage of the population aged 18± 24 (negative, contrary to expectations).
We now discuss the last three columns of Table 3 which display equation estimates for 1985. As in 1992, spending on one programme exerts a signi® cant positive in¯uence on spending on the other programme. In the education spend ing equation, signi® cant in¯uences are crime-related spend ing (positive), education (negative, contrary to expectations), and student share of the population (negative). The negative sign on student share of the population might arise when states that experience relatively high student-population growth ® nd it more di� cult to maintain, or increase, fund ing per student. For example, if it takes several years for spending to`catch-up' with student-population increase, the short-term relationship between student-population and education spending per pupil might be negative.
1 3 In the case of crime spending, signi® cant in¯uences are education spending (positive) and employee dominance (positive, as hypothesized). Estimation of the crime rate equation indi cates the following signi® cant in¯uences: crime spending (negative), the previous year's crime rate (positive), the con temporaneous unemployment rate (negative), and the change in the unemployment rate (positive). The negative sign on the contemporaneous unemployment rate may sim ply indicate that, after controlling for other factors which in¯uence crime rates, states with higher unemployment rates had lower crime rates. The same is true for the unex pected inverse relationship between the crime rate in 1992 and the percentage of the population aged 18± 24. After controlling for other factors, we ® nd that states with larger percentages of their population composed of individuals aged 18± 24 had lower crime rates in 1992. Perhaps this indicates that there was an e� ective nationwide e� ort to reduce crimes committed by youth, as when police depart ments across the country might have instituted programmes directed toward reducing crimes in this age group. Or, it could be that individuals in the 18± 24 age group have a low propensity to report crimes, so not as many crimes become know to the authorities.
V. ESTIMATION OF CORRECTIONS AND EDUCATION SPENDING EQUATIONS
Because the argument that crime-related spending crowdsout education spending often appears to be based on the recent growth in prisons and inmates, we now estimate our model with spending on corrections as a replacement for total crime-related spending. Measured on a per capita basis, correctional spending allows us to consider whether this particular area of crime spending crowds-out school spending, an argument often made in California. Spending on corrections is a considerable and growing portion of total spending on crime-related programmes, and one whose magnitude varies widely across the states. While mean levels of total crime-related spending per capita are US$273.63 (1992) and US$155.41 (1985) , mean levels of correctional spending per capita are US$96.52 (1992) and US$47.86 (1985) . Therefore, mean percentages of total crime-related spending allocated to corrections are 35% (1992) and 31% (1985) . The range of correctional spending in 1992 is US$224.83 (Alaska) ± US$32.28 (West Virginia); and for 1985 the range is US$234.11 (Alaska) ± $17.38 (West Virginia). Table 4 displays the TSLS estimates of spending on state and local education and correctional programmes, and the crime rate. The ® rst three columns show the estimates for 1992. In both cases of public spending equations, spending on one programme exerts a signi® cant positive in¯uence on spending on the other programme. That is, spending on corrections is found to positively in¯uence education spend ing, and spending on education is found to positively in¯u ence spending on corrections. In the education spending equation, signi® cant in¯uences are crime-related spending (positive), income (positive, as hypothesized), education (negative, contrary to expectations), and numbers of schools (positive). The results indicate an inverse relationship be tween education spending per pupil and the percentage of the population with at least a high school degree. A possible explanation for this is that parents without a high school degree realize how important a degree is, and are willing to support increased levels of spending to improve the educa tional success of their o� spring.
In the case of the corrections spending equation, signi® cant in¯uences are education spending (positive), the con temporaneous crime rate (positive, as hypothesized), and employee dominance (positive, as hypothesized). Estimation of the crime rate equation indicates the following signi® cant in¯uences: previous year's crime rates (positive, as hy pothesized) and the percentage of the population aged 18± 24 (negative, contrary to expectations).
The last three columns of Table 4 display equation esti mates for 1985. As in 1992, spending on one programme exerts a signi® cant positive in¯uence on spending on the other programme. In the education spending equation, sig ni® cant in¯uences are crime-related spending (positive), income (positive, as hypothesized), student share of the population (negative), and the federal share of funding (negative). As previously suggested, the negative sign on student share of the population might arise when states that experience relatively high student-population growth ® nd it more di� cult to maintain, or increase, funding per student. In the corrections spending equation, signi® cant in¯uences are education spending (positive) and employee dominance (positive, as hypothesized). Estimation of the crime rate equation indicates the following signi® cant in¯uences: cor rections spending (negative, as hypothesized), the previous year's crime rate (positive), and the change in the unemploy ment rate (positive).
VI . ESTI MATIONS USING PERCENTAGE CHANGES OVER 1995± 1988
Table 5 displays estimates of spending and crime rate equa tions where these variables are measured as percentage changes over 1992± 1985. These equations were estimated in order to determine how changes in these variables over this time period in¯uenced one another. As with the dependent variables, we also calculated percentage changes in all ex planatory variables. These models are another approach to determining whether crime-related spending crowded-out spending on education over this period. The ® rst three columns display estimations of percentage changes in education spending per pupil, total crimerelated spending, and the crime rate. Estimations of these relationships mirror the results from our previous estimations that focused on single-year relationships. That is, each programme exerts a positive in¯uence on the other over this time period. Therefore, there is no evidence that either programme crowded-out the other over this time frame.
In the education spending equation, signi® cant in¯uences are crime-related spending (positive), student-share of the population (negative), and diversity (positive, contrary to expectations). In the equations for the percentage change in education spending per pupil between 1992 and 1985, the diversity variable is positive and we hypothesized a negative sign. The positive relationship between the diversity vari able and expenditure per pupil means that those states whose populations became more racial/ethnically homo geneous had the greatest percentage increases in expendi ture per pupil. This may suggest that individuals prefer to locate in homogeneous communities, and when the com munity makeup changes towards the preferred homogene ous one, they are willing to increase spending on their children's education. Also, it could be that greater racial/ethnic diversity among the population gives rise to demands for a greater variety of public expenditure pro grammes, and with a greater variety of public expenditure programmes there is less expenditure per programme, in cluding education.
In the crime spending equation, signi® cant in¯uences are education spending (positive) and crime-related employees as a share of the population (positive, as hypothesized). In the crime rate equation, signi® cant in¯uences are the lagged crime rate (positive) and median age of the population (positive). Interestingly, the percentage change in total crime-related spending does not exert a statistically signi® cant in¯uence on the percentage change in the crime rate over this period.
The last three columns display estimations of percentage changes in education spending per pupil, correctional spending per capita, and the crime rate. While both spend ing programmes are found to exert positive in¯uences on each other, only one programme (corrections) is estimated to exert a statistically signi® cant in¯uence on the other programme (education). In the education spending equa tion, signi® cant in¯uences are corrections (positive), student share of the population (negative), federal share of funding (negative), and diversity (positive, contrary to expectations). In the correctional spending equation, the only signi® cant in¯uence is employee dominance (positive, as hypothesized). Estimation of the crime rate equation reveals the lagged crime rate (positive) and median age (positive) as signi® cant in¯uences.
VI I. CONCLUSIONS
Estimation of our models suggests no evidence that crime related programmes have crowded-out spending on educa tion in 1992, 1985, or between the period 1985± 92 at the level of state and local governments. However, our empiri cal analysis provides strong support for a positive relation ship between these areas of public spending. In other words, `big' spenders on education tended to be `big' spenders on crime as well because those states that allocated relatively large levels of resources to one programme also allocated a relatively large level of resources to the other programme. Moreover, when spending on correctional programmes is substituted for total spending on crime, this same result appears in most cases as well: those states with relatively high resource commitments to education programmes also provide relatively high resource commitments to correctional programmes. These results indicate that spending decisions on these programmes do not arise within an environment of a zero-sum game; i.e., a spending increase in one programme is not funded by decreasing funding commitment to the other programme. Rather, in creases in either of these programmes are funded through either reductions in other programmes, general tax in creases, or issuance of additional public debt. Which of these options appears most likely cannot be answered with in our paper's framework and therefore remains an interest ing and open research issue.
Another area for future research would be to examine what in¯uence, if any, `three strikes' laws may exert on education programmes. Because`three strikes' laws are rela tively new, and have not been passed by all states, data are not readily available with which to examine the e� ects of such laws on education programmes. However, while it may be true that future relationships between spending on edu cation and crime-related programmes may change into ones that are consistent with the crowding-out hypothesis, it should be noted that the empirical evidence presented here is consistent with the previous literature and o� ers no sup port for the hypothesis that any particular spending pro gramme crowds-out any other spending programme of state or local governments.
